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Just Don't Say You Heard It From Me:
Bridging the Davis v. Washington Divide of
Indistinguishable Primary-Purpose Statements
by THOMAS M. FORSYTH III*

I. Introduction
"I hate it when they reach into their jackets like that-it makes me
think they have a gun," a woman said to her husband as they briskly
walked past the usual crowd of thugs and drug dealers congregated on the
seediest stretch of San Francisco's Market Street. Just moments earlier, as
they approached the group, they had noticed a struggle ensuing up ahead.
They slowed their pace to cautiously watch and wait until the incident
subsided. Once the scuffle appeared to have played out, the couple quickly
proceeded past the group. One thug walking toward them reached into his
jacket just as he passed them and the wife voiced her concern to her
husband. Just as the couple passed the small crowd, someone yelled, "He's
got a gun-he's got a pistol!" Several shots rang out and people on the
sidewalk started yelling. Instinctively, the husband threw his wife into the
gutter and attempted to shield her body with his own. As they laid face
down in filth, someone behind them cried, "Help me! I've been shot!"
The couple's cell-phone calls to 911 yielded only busy signals, but
within minutes half a dozen police cars and twice as many officers
surrounded them. The gunman had fled on foot and four victims had been
shot; police swarmed the area in an attempt to resolve the emergency and
locate the perpetrator. Two officers approached the couple, separated
them, and asked each a series of questions concerning what had happened.
Although it all seemed surreal, they each provided the best description
J.D. 2008, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; B.S. 2003, The Marriott
School of Management, Brigham Young University. The author would like to thank his loving
wife, Angela, for her patience and support while he was writing this note and she was pregnant
with their first child, Jackson. He would also like to thank Professor Roger C. Park and the
unidentified individual who nearly shot him and his wife on Market Street for inspiring him to
write on this topic.
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possible of the individuals they had seen. Without pause after the last
inquiry of each officer's line of questioning, they asked the husband and
wife, "Would you like to volunteer your personal contact information?"
Without time for reflection, the wife provided her information, while
the husband immediately declined to identify himself. If the gunman in
this hypothetical situation were apprehended and charged with shooting the
four victims, and the couple's statements were used against him at trial,
would the gunman have the constitutional right to confront and crossexamine the couple as to their statements?
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides that "[i]n
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be
confronted with the witnesses against him."1 This procedural guarantee 2 is
applicable to federal criminal proceedings, as well as their state
counterparts, by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment. 3 While this
provision could be taken literally to require all witnesses to testify in court
against the accused, the Supreme Court has long taken a more moderate
approach holding that not all hearsay witness statements are subject to
confrontation in the form of cross-examination in court.4
In Crawford v. Washington,5 the Court revamped its Confrontation
Clause analysis by placing all hearsay statements into one of two
categories: testimonial and non-testimonial.6 It held that only testimonial
statements are subject to confrontation 7 because the declarant has
functioned as a witness. 8 Non-testimonial hearsay statements, however, are
not subject to Confrontation Clause scrutiny and are admissible into
evidence provided they fall under a valid hearsay exception. 9 In its most
recent Confrontation Clause case, Davis v. Washington,10 the Supreme
1.

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

2. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004). See also Richard D. Friedman,
Grapplingwith the Meaning of "Testimonial," 71 BROOK. L. REv. 241, 246 (2005).
3. See Ariana J. Torchin, Note, A Multidimensional Framework for the Analysis of
Testimonial Hearsay Under Crawford v. Washington, 94 GEO. L.J. 581, 608 n. 157 (2006).
4. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 62-63 (1980); Geetanjli Malhotra, Note, Resolving the
Ambiguity Behind the Bright-Line Rule: The Effect of Crawford v. Washington on the
Admissibility of 911 Calls in Evidence-Based Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 2006 U. ILL. L.
REV. 205, 207 (2006).
5. Crawford,541 U.S. 36.
6. Id. at 68.
7. Id. at 68-69.
8.

Friedman, supra note 2, at 246.

9. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
10. Davis v. Washington, From Lexis: 126 S. Ct. 2266*, 165 L. Ed. 2d 224, 2006 U.S.
LEXIS 4886 (2006) *All pagination subject to change pending release of the final published
version.
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Court more clearly defined testimonial and non-testimonial statements
based on the purpose for which the statement was made.11 Testimonial
statements are those made with the primary purpose of establishing facts
for use in future prosecution, while non-testimonial statements have the
primary purpose of assisting in an ongoing emergency. 12 While Crawford
left the impression, 13 Davis explicitly declared that only testimonial
statements are subject to Confrontation Clause scrutiny. 14
Despite the Court articulating a two-pronged standard focused on the
extreme ends of the testimonial spectrum, the Court has not provided a
sound framework for the middle of the spectrum where hearsay statements
made to law enforcement have a mixed or dual purpose 15 and the primary
purpose is indiscernible. Therefore, as the case law stands today, there is
no clear answer as to whether the hypothetical gunman has a constitutional
right to confront the witness couple because the Supreme Court has left a
gaping hole in this area of evidence law and criminal procedure.
This note will posit that the litmus test for determining whether a
witness hearsay statement is testimonial or non-testimonial, when the
primary purpose of the interrogation is indistinguishable, should be
whether or not the witness provides his or her personal contact information
to law enforcement for future contact. Volunteering or refusing to
volunteer such information is indicative of the declarant's primary intent in
making statements to police and serves as the circumstantial evidence
objectively indicating "the primary purpose of the interrogation"' 6 in the
Davis analysis. Under this proposed "primary intent test," providing
contact information indicates a willingness to assist in future (almost
certainly prosecutorial) proceedings regarding the incident-yielding a
testimonial statement under Davis. A refusal to provide contact
information indicates a desire to assist solely in the immediate, ongoing
emergency and unwillingness to assist in future prosecutorial attemptsresulting in a non-testimonial statement under the Davis framework.

11. See id. at 2274 n. 1 (indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to be
analyzed using the declarant's statements).
12. Id. at 2273-74.
13. See Crawford,541 U.S. at 68-69; Tom Lininger, ReconceptualizingConfrontation After
Davis, 85 TEX. L. REv. 271, 306 (2006).
14. Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2274-75.
15. Such a statement would be one in which the declarant intends to assist in the resolution
of the ongoing emergency and to supply law enforcement with statements potentially useful in
the prosecution of the assailant.
16.

Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2273-74.
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II. Historical Progression of the Confrontation Clause Case Law
A look at Confrontation Clause history is helpful in understanding the
current problems facing courts in applying the Davis ruling to mixedpurpose statements. Within the last twenty-five years, the case law that
pertains to the constitutional right to confrontation has become
simultaneously more accurate and more vague. It is more accurate because
the focus has shifted from a statement's subjective reliability to the type of
statements made,17 thereby restoring it as a procedural, rather than a
9
substantive, guarantee' 8-the original intention of the Sixth Amendment.'
However, it is also more vague because while the Supreme Court has
brought the confrontation analysis framework into line with its historical
purpose, the Court has not yet provided a comprehensive definition of
testimonial and non-testimonial statements.2z
A.

Ohio v. Roberts

In 1980, the Supreme Court articulated the requirements for admission
of hearsay evidence to meet constitutional guarantees of confrontation.2 1 In
Ohio v. Roberts, a grand jury indicted respondent Herschel Roberts for
forgery of a check in the name of Bernard Isaacs and possession of stolen
credit cards belonging to Isaacs and his wife.22 In this preliminary hearing,
Roberts tried to get the Isaacs' daughter, Anita, to testify that she gave
Roberts her parents' checks and credit cards, without telling him that she
was not permitted to use them, while he stayed at her apartment. 23
Although Roberts had stayed at Anita's apartment, she denied giving him
the checks and cards.24
At Roberts' subsequent trial, Anita was unavailable to testify25 and the
trial court admitted the transcript of her preliminary hearing testimony into
evidence.26 Roberts claimed a violation of his right to confrontation and

17. See Malhotra, supra note 4, at 209-10.
18. See Friedman, supra note 2, at 246.
19. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004).
20. See Lininger, supra note 13, at 280.
21. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
22. Id. at 58.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See id. at 59-62. The Court held that Anita was constitutionally unavailable because her
parents had no idea where to find her and the prosecution had made a good faith effort to obtain
her presence at trial. Id. at 74-75.
26. Id. at 60.
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the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed, holding that mere cross-examination at a
preliminary hearing was insufficient for confrontation purposes at trial.27
On certiorari, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Ohio Supreme
Court's ruling and held that hearsay testimony from a prior preliminary
hearing could come in at a criminal proceeding if there was a necessity (the
witness was unavailable for the current proceeding) and the prior testimony
bore adequate "indicia of reliability. 2 8 To meet this reliability test,
evidence need merely fall under a "firmly rooted hearsay exception" 29 or
bear "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness., 30 The Court held that
Anita Isaacs' preliminary hearing testimony was admissible because
Roberts availed himself of the opportunity to cross-examine that same
31
testimony and the transcript bore sufficient "indicia of reliability.,
The focus of Roberts was to ensure the truth and reliability of a prior
statement.32 The Court stated that the purpose of the Confrontation Clause
is to provide the jury opportunity to determine the veracity of a witness'
statements by watching him give such testimony.33 While the reliability of
statements is certainly a central concern, the Roberts Court set too low a
hurdle for admissibility, 34 reducing the Confrontation Clause to little more
than statutory hearsay law in most prosecutions. 35 This watered-down
standard missed the mark on the crux of confrontation-cross36
examination.
B. Crawford v. Washington
In 2004, the Supreme Court overruled the Roberts holding,
recognizing its inconsistency and unpredictability.3 7 The Court then
adjusted the Confrontation Clause requirements to reflect its original
27. Id. at 59-61.
28. Id. at 66.
29. Id. Firmly rooted hearsay exceptions include agent admissions, excited utterances,
statements to treating physicians, dying declarations, prior testimony, public records, and business
records. See CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, 4 FEDERAL EVIDENCE §

398 (2d ed. 1994).
30. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
31. Id. at 73.
32. Id. at 65-66.
33. Id. at 63-64 (citing Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895)).
34. See Tom Lininger, ProsecutingBatterersAfter Crawford, 91 VA. L. REV. 747, 756-60
(2005) (discussing the weakness of the Roberts confrontation requirements).
35. Lininger, supra note 13, at 276-77; Thomas J. Reed, Crawford v. Washington and the
Irretrievable Breakdown of a Union: Separating the Confrontation Clause from the Hearsay
Rule, 56 S.C. L. REV. 185, 199-211 (2004).
36. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61-62 (2004).
37. Id. at 66.
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substantive guarantee "that reliability be assessed in a particular manner:
by testing in the crucible of cross-examination. 3 8 In Crawford, Petitioner
Michael Crawford was charged with assault and attempted murder for
stabbing a man he claimed attempted to rape his wife. 39 After Crawford's
wife told him about the alleged rape, the two went to the victim's
apartment. 40 A struggle ensued and Crawford claimed he stabbed the
victim in self-defense. 4 1 However, upon questioning by police, Crawford
and his wife related differing stories as to what transpired.42
The Court overruled the twenty-four-year-old Roberts precedent and
delineated two categories for all hearsay statements-testimonial and nontestimonial.43 The Court held that "[w]here testimonial statements are at
issue, the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional
44
demands is the one the Constitution actually prescribes: confrontation.
When the declarant of the testimonial statement is unavailable, a prior
opportunity for cross-examination is required to satisfy Confrontation
Clause requirements.4 5 The Court said that "testimonial" statements are "at
a minimum.., prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand
jury, or at a former trial; and.., police interrogations. 4 6 However, states
were to decide whether non-testimonial statements were subject to
Confrontation Clause scrutiny and admissible under state-law hearsay
requirements.47
The Crawford decision radically transformed the constitutional
landscape. 48 Yet despite the delineation between testimonial and nontestimonial statements, the Court explicitly left "for another day any effort
to spell out a comprehensive definition of 'testimonial,' '49 leaving the rest

38. Id. at 61, 66.
39. Id. at 38, 40.
40. Id. at 38.
41. Id. at 38-40.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 68.
44. Id. at 68-69.
45. Id. at 59, 68.
46. Id. at 68.
47. Id.
48. Robert P. Mosteller, Crawford v. Washington: Encouraging and Ensuring the
Confrontation of Witnesses, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 511, 511 (2005) (asserting that Crawford
"radically changed Confrontation Clause doctrine .... ); Deborah Tuerkheimer, Crawford's
Triangle: Domestic Violence and the Right to Confrontation,85 N.C. L. REV. 1, 20 (2006).
49. Crawford,541 U.S. at 68.
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of the judiciary to decipher the Court's "cryptic clues.",50 Lack of a
definitive rule confused lower courts and prosecutors in Crawford
application. 5 Chief Justice Rehnquist predicted such confusion in his
Crawford concurrence 52 and Justice Scalia, writing for the Crawford
majority, acknowledged "[t]he Chief Justice's objection that [the Court's]
refusal to articulate a comprehensive definition... [would] cause interim
uncertainty., 53 However,
Scalia concluded, "it can hardly be any worse
' 54
quo.
status
the
than
C. Davis v. Washington
In Davis, the Supreme Court attempted to provide some guidance to
the "testimonial" definition left open in Crawford.5 5 The Court granted
certiorariin two separate cases (Davis v. Washington, No. 05-5224, and

Hammon v. Indiana, No. 05-5705) and consolidated them to
illustrate the
56
interrogations.
police
of
analysis
testimonial/non-testimonial
In Davis, No. 05-5224, Michelle McCottry called 911 to report that
her boyfriend, Adrian Davis, was beating her. 57 During McCottry's
conversation with the 911 operator, Davis fled the home. 58 Police officers
arrived shortly thereafter, finding McCottry injured and shaken. 59 The
Supreme Court of Washington upheld Davis' conviction of felony violation
of a domestic no-contact order and ruled that McCottry's identification of
Davis during the 911 call was non-testimonial and therefore not subject to
the Confrontation Clause.60
In Hammon, No. 05-5705, police responded to a "'reported domestic
disturbance' at the home of Hershel and Amy Hammon.,' 61 Officers

50. Brooks Holland, Testimonial Statements under Crawford: What Makes Testimony...
Testimonial?, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 281, 282 (2005).
51. See Tuerkheimer, supra note 48, at 20 ("A survey of the post-Crawford case law
reflects, to be generous, a state of confusion.").
52. See Crawford,541 U.S. at 75-76 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
53. Id. at 68 n.10 (majority opinion) (internal citations omitted).
54. Id.
55. Davis v. Washington, FromLexis: 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2273*, 165 L. Ed. 2d 224, 237, 2006
U.S. LEXIS 4886, 15 (2006) *All pagination subject to change pending release of the final
published version.
56. See id. at 2270-74.
57. Id. at 2270-71.
58. Id. at 2271.
59. Id.
60. Id. at2271-72.
61. Id. at 2272.
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separated the couple for questioning as to what had occurred.62 Amy
Hammon filled out and signed a battery affidavit, describing Hershel's
abusive actions that evening.63 The Indiana Supreme Court upheld
Hershel's conviction of domestic battery and probation violation.64 The
Indiana court ruled that Amy's oral statements were non-testimonial but
that the affidavit was testimonial and thus wrongfully admitted.65
However, the court held the admission of the affidavit without
confrontation to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.66
On certiorari, the Supreme Court created the binary rule that
statements made in response to police interrogations are non-testimonial
when "circumstances objectively indicat[e] that the primary purpose of the
interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing
emergency., 67
Statements are testimonial when the "circumstances
objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the
primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events
potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution., 68 The Court granted
discretion to trial courts in going through the testimonial/non-testimonial
analysis.69
Under this ambiguous 70 framework of temporal boundaries, 7' the
Court held that McCottry's statements to the 911 operator (deemed a law
enforcement agent) were non-testimonial because they were made in an
effort to assist in the resolution of the ongoing emergency of Davis'
abuse. 72 The Court held that Amy Hammon's oral statements to police
were testimonial because they were a narrative of past events in response to

62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 2272-73.
65. Id. at 2273.
66. Id.
67. Id. See also Tuerkheimer, supra note 48, at 27. The Davis dichotomy is strikingly
similar to the Court's public safety exception to Miranda requirements outlined in New York v.
Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 658-59 (1984) ("We think police officers can and will distinguish almost
instinctively between questions necessary to secure their own safety or the safety of the public
and questions designed solely to elicit testimonial evidence from a suspect.").
68. Id. at 2273-74.
69. Id. at 2277.
70. See Richard D. Friedman, Crawford, Davis, and Way Beyond 6 (2006), http://wwwpersonal.umich.edu/-rdfrdman/brooklyn06.pdf [hereinafter Way Beyond].
71.

Lininger, supra note 13, at 279.

72. Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2274, 2276-78.
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structured police questioning, were made out of her husband's presence,
and were given at some time removed from the danger.73
The Davis holding added flesh to Crawford's bones and could be said
to have completely overruled Roberts.74 The Davis Court held that the
Constitution requires confrontation to ensure reliability when statements
are made for the primary purpose of establishing facts relevant to
prosecution.75 The Davis case is merely the most recent step in an attempt
to return the Confrontation Clause to its original role in criminal procedure.
While Confrontation Clause analysis has undergone radical changes over
the past few years, "the locus of the ambiguity has simply shifted over
time, from the term 'reliable' (in Roberts) to the term 'testimonial' (in
Crawford) to the term 'emergency' (in Davis). 76
III. Problem: The Great Davis Divide
Despite the fact that Crawford delineated the basic framework for
Confrontation Clause analysis of hearsay statements, and Davis provided a
refined definition of "testimonial," the Court left open a wide chasm
between the primary purpose of future prosecution and the primary purpose
of resolving an ongoing emergency. Such legal construction paints the
Confrontation world in two colors-black and white-with no guidance in
maneuvering through the various shades of gray found in Davis's realworld application.
These gray areas specifically involve common situations, such as the
hypothetical shooting scenario, where witness statements to police have a
mixed purpose of both helping to resolve an emergency and providing
information for future prosecution. In such cases, how can any court apply
the Crawford-Davis framework to determine whether or not a hearsay
statement is testimonial and subject to confrontation or non-testimonial and
admissible against the accused merely by falling under a valid hearsay
exception? In the hypothetical scenario, the Crawford-Davis framework
provides no means of determining whether or not the couple's statements
would require confrontation.

73. Id. at 2278-79.
74. Lininger, supra note 13, at 280.
75.
76.

See Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2273-74; Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004).
Lininger, supra note 13, at 280.
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IV. Proposed Solution for Determining the Primary Purpose of
Witness Statements
Trial judges are left with the responsibility of making the
testimonial/non-testimonial determination. 7 The constitutional right to
confrontation is too important to allow ambiguity to govern. Therefore,
some method must be devised to provide uniformity and predictability
within the judiciary when dealing with mixed-purpose, indistinguishable
primary-purpose statements, such as in the hypothetical scenario described
above.
The Davis Court's testimonial/non-testimonial framework hinges on
the objective indication of the primary purpose of a police interrogation
derived from the surrounding circumstances. 7 8 The question remains,
however, from whose perspective are the objective circumstances of the
interrogation to be seen in order to divine its primary purpose? 79 Should
the circumstances be seen from the perspective of the questioning law
enforcement agent, the declarant making the statements, or a reasonable,
neutral third party?
A. Perspective Versus Intent
A reasonable, neutral third party is merely an observer of the
circumstances, while the declarant and the questioning officer are active
participants in the interrogation. Thus, if the third party's perspective
governs, that party will analyze the totality of the circumstances ex post
facto to determine the primary purpose of the interrogation. However, if
the declarant's or the interrogating officer's perspective governs, what they
perceived can only be derived from statements they made at the time of the
interrogation-body-language analysis would be indeterminate. 8° To avoid
a battle of semantics, the nature of statements can only be derived from the
intent of either the declarant or the officer in making those statements.
Intent must be used in the soft sense-that the declarant or officer intended
the natural consequences of their statements. 81 Therefore, when discussing
the perspective of either the declarant or the interrogating officer, an
examination of perspective is really an analysis of their respective intents.
77. Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2277; see also Roger C. Park, Purpose as a Guide to the
Interpretationof the Confrontation Clause, 71 BROOK. L. REv. 297, 302 (2005).
78. Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2273-74.
79. See Leading Cases, 120 HARV. L. REv. 125, 218 (2006).
80. See Jason Bloom & Karin Powdermaker, The Jury Likes Me, the Jury Likes Me Not:
Building Rapport in the Courtroom, 69 TEX. B. J. 540 (2006) (body language does not
communicate 100 percent of a person's message).
81.

Friedman, supra note 2, at 252.
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B. Whose Intent Governs?
There is strong support for the proposition that the declarant's intent
should govern the primary purpose analysis. An examination of the three
potential perspectives strengthens that argument. Turning first to the
reasonable third person (a sort of jurisprudential celebrity), many might
argue that the Davis rule compels courts to see the circumstances
surrounding the interrogation through this objective and neutral lens.
Facially, such an approach would seem to remove all subjectivity from the
analysis and have the advantage of viewing the totality of the
circumstances. However, deeper probing reveals that such an approach
would be neither practical nor academically sound.82 A jury should not be
privy to potentially testimonial statements before they have been admitted
into evidence and confronted.83 To allow the jury to represent the
reasonable third party in making the testimonial/non-testimonial
determination would taint it instantaneously. By default, a judge would be
required to assume the role. However, what objective criteria would a
judge use in examining the statements? Without a standard of review, a
judge's (or anyone else's) "objective" perspective on the subject would be
inherently subjective. Such subjectivity and unpredictability were the main
Roberts vices of which the Crawford Court sought to dispose. 84 Therefore,
any claimed reasonable, objective, and neutral third party perspective
would be nothing more than a subjective opinion on an objective
indication. Such a test would be wholly unreliable.
Several commentators have expressed the view that while Crawford
focused on the subjective intent of the declarant, Davis shifted the focus to
the intent of the interrogating law enforcement agent.85 This belief is
derived from a myopic reading of the "primary purpose of the

82. See Torchin, supra note 3, at 588-90.
83. See FED. R. EVID. 104(a) ("Preliminary questions concerning ...the admissibility of
evidence shall be determined by the court," as opposed to the jury).
84. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62-66 (2004).
85. Lininger, supra note 13, at 280; see also Josephine Ross, After Crawford Double-Speak:
"Testimony" Does Not Mean Testimony and "Witness" Does Not Mean "Witness," 97 J. GRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 147, 178 (2006) ("[W]hat is testimonial turns on the objective primary intent
of the officer gathering the information .. ");Leading Cases, supra note 79, at 218-19; Thomas
L. Hudson & Patrick C. Coppen, Appellate Highlights, ARIz. AT'Y, Dec. 2006, at 46, 47 ("It
appears that ... Davis may have shifted its focus of inquiry... from the motivations or
reasonable expectations of the accuser, to the primary purpose of the interrogation."); Jeffrey A.
Zick, Rethinking Confrontation:A Look at Crawford v. Washington, ARIZ. ATV'Y, Sept. 2006, at
28, 32 ("Thus, the focus now is on the primary purpose of the interrogation, not necessarily the
motivations of the declarant.").
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interrogation" language of the Davis holding;8 6 however, this viewpoint is
contradicted by both logic and a comprehensive analysis of the Davis
opinion.
Reliance on an officer's perspective would arguably always yield a
testimonial statement (or at least a mixed-purpose statement, which creates
a problem identical to the one being addressed) because, while law
enforcement has the dual purpose of responding to emergencies and
gathering evidence to bring perpetrators to justice, 87 the ultimate goal is
nearly always the latter.88 Emergency resolution is merely a necessary step
toward that end. With any form of crime, a police officer would be lax in
his professional and civic duty if he were not looking toward future
prosecution even while attempting to resolve the emergency before him or
her.89 Since assisting in bringing criminals to justice is presumably always
the ultimate intention of law enforcement, relying exclusively on the
interrogator's perspective would effectively eliminate the existence of nontestimonial statements. The mere distinction between testimonial and nontestimonial statements lends credence to the declarant-centered approach.
In his Davis dissent, Justice Thomas stated that the Supreme Court has
"repeatedly ...reject[ed] tests dependent on the subjective intentions of
police officers." 90 He said that police officers' motives are "not reliably
discernible" 91 and that attempting to ascertain such would "inevitably be,
quite simply, an exercise in fiction. 92 Moreover, focusing on an
interrogating officer's intent would allow for manipulation of the
Court
questioning structure,93 the very "prosecutorial abuse" the Crawford
94
familiar.
keenly
were
Framers
the
which
"with
danger,
a
as
named

86. See Davis v. Washington, From Lexis: 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2273-74*, 165 L. Ed. 2d 224,
237, 2006 U.S. LEXIS 4886, 16 (2006) *All pagination subject to change pending release of the
final publishedversion.
87. See id. at 2283 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part); Ann
Hetherwick Pumphrey, Admissibility of Hearsay Statements to Police: Davis v. Washington and
Hammon v. Indiana, BOSTON B. J., Nov./Dec. 2006, at 17, 18.
88. The ultimate means of protecting the public is arguably to prosecute and incarcerate
offenders so they are unable to further endanger the public.
89. It merits mention that the intent and purpose of a police officer is distinguishable from
that of a 911 operator (such as the operator in Davis who has the primary objective of dispatching
emergency personnel to the scene of an accident, and therefore, is predominantly concerned with
emergency resolution).
90. Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2283 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in

part).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Ross, supra note 85, at 183.
94. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 n.7 (2004).
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The Davis text itself denounces an interrogator-centered approach and
supports the declarant-centered proposition.
In the footnote to the
definition of testimonial statements, Justice Scalia added "it is in the final
analysis the declarant's statements, not the interrogator's questions, that the
Confrontation Clause requires us to evaluate." 95 This is a direct repudiation
of the Indiana Supreme Court's ruling that "the
motivations of the
96
questioner and declarant are the central concerns.,
If we are not to evaluate the interrogator's questions, there should be
no focus on the motivation or primary purpose of the interrogator's
statements in the Davis analysis and we are left solely to consider the
declarant's statements. As stated previously, if the sole indication of the
objective nature of the circumstances is the declarant's statements, it
logically follows that the primary purpose of the statements can only be
deduced from the declarant's intent. Any other inquiry would result in a
battle of semantics.
Professor Richard D. Friedman, an outspoken advocate of the
declarant-centered approach, 97 continues to argue, even post-Davis, that
confrontation analysis should focus on the intent of the declarant in
determining whether a statement is testimonial. 98 Bolstering the post-Davis
validity of the declarant-centered approach, Scalia's Davis opinion cited
Bourjaily, a Roberts-era case, in which the accused was convicted (based
on his statements to an undercover FBI agent) of coordinating a cocaine
deal for the agent. 99 Scalia suggested that the statements in Bourjaily were
"clearly non-testimonial" because they were "made unwittingly to a
Government informant."' 100 Thus, despite the fact that the agent's primary
purpose in eliciting incriminating information from the accused was to
prosecute him, the statements were deemed non-testimonial because the
declarant did not, and could not, appreciate the nature of the situation.l°1
95. Davis, 126 S.Ct. at 2274 n..
96. Id. at 2273 (quoting Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444, 457 (Ind. 2005) (emphasis
added)).
97. Torchin, supra note 3, at 595.
98. See Way Beyond, supra note 70, at 4 ("1 have previously stated at length reasons why the
witness's perspective should be the crucial one in determining whether a statement is
testimonial.").
99.
100.

Davis, 126 S.Ct. at 2275; Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 173-74 (1987).
Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2275 (citing Bourjaily,483 U.S. at 181-84).

101. See People v. Morgan, 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 224, 233 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (admission did not
violate Confrontation Clause because of, among other things, its "unintentional nature");
Friedman, supra note 2, at 255-56 ("[I]f the intention of a government agent to gather evidence
for use in prosecution is the critical consideration, then such a statement is clearly testimonial, for
that is precisely what the agent is trying to do. So what makes the statement non-testimonial?
Clearly it is that the declarantdid not anticipate a prosecutorial use of the statement.").
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Thus, the focus was on the declarant's intent, not the agent's statements or
intentions.
Despite misguided suggestions to the contrary, Davis did not shift the
objective indications of primary purpose from the intent of the declarant to
the intent of the interrogator. Although Davis refers to the "primary
purpose of the interrogation,"'' 0 2 the questioning officer's intent and the
perspective of a reasonable third person are unworkable in divining that
primary purpose. Therefore, the intent of the declarant alone should govern
and the pertinent question in the Davis analysis becomes, "Did the
declarant'sstatements objectively indicate that the primary purpose of the
interrogation was to assist in the resolution of an ongoing emergency, or to
provide facts pertinent to future prosecution?"
C. Divining a Primary Purpose From a Mixed-Purpose Statement
In an attempt to work within the Davis "primary purpose" framework,
how is a court to extract a primary purpose when there is a mixed or dual
purpose in the declarant's statement? One might argue that in a mixedpurpose situation, the dominant purpose10 3 should govern and constitute the
primary purpose. This begs the question, how does a court determine the
dominant purpose? Should a court use a percentage allocation between the
declarant's purpose of aiding future prosecution and purpose of assisting in
emergency resolution? That seems logical, but what criteria would be used
in determining the allocation?
Would a fifty-one percent purpose
constitute a dominant, and thus primary, purpose? While that is a faciallyclean breakdown, a quantitative analysis of qualitative statements is
ultimately impractical.
Alternatively, one might argue that because the Court left the analysis
in the hands of trial judges, 0 4 a standard balancing test is sufficient to
ascertain the declarant's intent. Judges could merely weigh the strength of
the two purposes and decide which is stronger. Yet again, what criteria
would be used in the analysis? How would an appellate court review such
05
a finding? It is no secret that balancing tests are easily manipulable, thus increasing the threat of prosecutorial (and judicial) abuse. Moreover,
defense attorneys would never sanction a lack of specific criteria.

102. Davis, 126 S.Ct. at 2273-74.
103. Friedman, supra note 2, at 252.
104. Davis, 126 S.Ct. at 2277.
105. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 67-68 (2004) ("By replacing categorical
constitutional guarantees with open-ended balancing tests, we do violence to their design. Vague
standards are manipulable ....
").
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In the end, the most obvious potential methods for primary-purpose
determination smack of the subjectivity and unreliability the Court
attempted to avoid by overruling Roberts.10 6 It should be obvious by now
that the schizophrenic 0 7 Davis framework is ill-equipped to deal with
mixed-purpose situations and another method must be developed for
primary-purpose determination.
One step in that direction may be to refine the definition of a statement
made with both the purpose to aid in resolving an ongoing emergency and
to assist in future prosecution. Analyzing hearsay statements as dual- or
mixed-purposed may be missing the forest for the trees by encouraging
comparisons in line with the binary Davis standard. 10 8 The key may be to
classify statements as having an "indistinguishable" primary purpose. This
would allow a single indicative factor to demonstrate the primary intent of
a declarant's statements, creating the objective circumstantial evidence that
indicates the primary purpose of the interrogation.
D. Divining a Primary Purpose From an Indistinguishable PrimaryPurpose Statement
If the determination of the primary purpose of a police interrogation is
based on the intent of the declarant's statements, what methods might be
employed to ascertain such intent? Two possibilities would be a direct
inquiry of the declarant or of the interrogating officer. As to the declarant,
it seems improper to ask them to state their intent ex post facto as time for
reflection upon potential negative consequences could cause a change in
their story. 10 9 This would also place entirely too much power in the
declarant's hands to dictate how their statement should be classified.
Certainly, the intent of the declarant must be determined at the exact
moment the statement was made.110 As the first three exceptions to the
federal hearsay rule11 require the declarant's statement to reflect
concurrent conditions' 12 to establish reliability, the moment of utterance

106. See id.at 62-66 ("The [Roberts] framework is so unpredictable that it fails to provide
meaningful protection from even core confrontation violations." Id. at 63.).
107. Lininger, supra note 13, at 280.
108. Cf Davis, 126 S.Ct. at 2273-74.
109. Rose Margaret Casey, Developments in the Law, The Survey of New York Practice,68
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 285, 287 (1994) ("[N]o time for reflection, thus eliminating the likelihood of
deliberate fabrication ....
").
110. See Friedman, supra note 2, at 251.
111.

FED. R. EVID. 803(1)-(3).

112. Id. 803(1) (defining "present sense impression" as "[a] statement describing or
explaining an event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition,
or immediately thereafter."); Id 803(2) (defining "excited utterance" as "[a] statement relating to
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must be the focal point for an authenticity analysis of the declarant's intent
for confrontation purposes. This is especially true if a non-testimonial
statement is to be admitted into evidence under one of the first two hearsay
exceptions. Additionally, establishing the declarant's intent from any
moment other than that of utterance increases the potential for prosecutorial
abuse. Police or prosecutors could later influence the declarant to testify as
to a testimonial intention in making the statement.
It would also be improper to ask the questioning officer's opinion as
to the declarant's intent, for the same reasons it would be erroneous to look
to the interrogator's intent in ascertaining primary purpose. Additionally,
relying on the interrogator's interpretation would raise concerns regarding
abuse" against which the Crawford Court
the "potential for prosecutorial
13
was so vehemently opposed.'"
Itquickly becomes apparent that any subjective inquiry into the
declarant's intent would result in the same reliance issues that led the
Supreme Court to overrule Roberts."l4 Therefore, by default, an objective
standard must be employed to determine intent.' 15 While cases may exist
in which the declarant specifically informs the interrogator that his or her
intent is merely to assist in the resolution of the ongoing emergency and not
to provide facts relevant to future prosecution, the average declarant is not
so Confrontation Clause conscious. One might argue that the solution is
for police officers to simply ask the declarant whether or not they would be
willing to assist in the future prosecution of the perpetrators against whom
they have just spoken. This would be as objective an indicator as any in
assessing intent, but defense attorneys would readily balk that the shock of
the question (even without time for reflection) would cause most witnesses
to refuse to involve themselves in prosecution. That would result in a
greater frequency of non-testimonial statements coming into evidence
without confrontation. Defense attorneys would also attack the proposal on
grounds that it is too easily manipulable by law enforcement and lends
itself to prosecutorial abuse.'" 6 So with the rare exception of instances
where the declarant verbally volunteers his or her intentions, objective
indications of a declarant's intent are difficult to ascertain.

a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused
by the event or condition."); Id. 803(3) (statements of "[t]hen existing mental, emotional, or
physical condition" do not include statements of memory).
113. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 n.7 (2004).
114. See id. at 62-66.
115. See Friedman, supra note 2, at 253-54.
116.

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56 n.7.
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E. Personal Contact Information and the "Primary Intent Test"
It is important to reiterate that the scope of this analysis is limited to
situations in which a declarant responds to police questioning immediately
following a crime where police are still responding to an ongoing
emergency and the declarant's statements have a mixed purpose (with an
indistinguishable primary purpose) of both assisting police in resolving the
emergency and providing information relevant to the future prosecution of
the perpetrator.
As discussed above, divining a declarant's intent presents a
formidable challenge to any court using that intent as a reflection of the
circumstances objectively indicating the primary purpose of the
interrogation under the Davis framework. 117 Nevertheless, one probable
method to objectively determine the declarant's intent in indistinguishable
primary-purpose situations is to look to whether or not the declarant agreed
to provide his or her personal contact information to the interrogating law
enforcement officer after answering police questioning. In a majority of
police interrogations, this is quite possibly the only objective, outward
manifestation of the declarant's intent.
This "primary intent test" would provide objective circumstantial
evidence as to whether the declarant's principal intent was to assist police
exclusively in meeting the emergency at hand or to give law enforcement
(and any other government official) the means to contact them in the future
regarding the incident, presumably in attempts to prosecute. By providing
their personal contact information after responding to police questioning, a
declarant implicitly indicates a willingness to assist law enforcement
officials post emergency resolution. Such a statement would be classified
as testimonial under the Davis framework.' 18 Conversely, a witness who
refuses to provide personal contact information implicitly indicates that
they wish only to assist in the resolution of the immediate emergency and
not to assist in the future prosecution of the perpetrator(s).
Such a
11 9
statement would be classified as non-testimonial under Davis.
The objective reliability of this primary intent test requires immediacy
on both the part of the interrogator and the declarant. Thus, the request for
personal contact information would necessarily be made in the regular flow
of questioning, immediately following the last factual inquiry regarding the
incident, and with complete impartiality on the officer's part. The
117. See Davis v. Washington, From Lexis: 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2273-74*, 165 L. Ed. 2d 224,
237, 2006 U.S. LEXIS 4886, 14-16 (2006) *All pagination subject to change pending release of
thefinal published version.
118. See id.
119. Id. at 2273.
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declarant's response, indicating intent, must be made without excessive
time for declarant deliberation, 20 for if the declarant has time for reflection
on the potential negative consequences of his or her statements, objectivity
would give way to subjectivity. Reflection would also grant the declarant
far too much power in the classification of his or her statements.
Spontaneity suggests trustworthiness and the purpose of the test is to
determine true intent, not provide declarants with a vehicle to evade
confrontation. Nevertheless, concerns of prosecutorial abuse based on the
timing of the interrogation and/or the partiality of the interrogating officer
could be mitigated by allowing the same officer to be cross-examined as to
his or her questioning method (to ensure there was no leading or
encouragement to withhold personal information, making the statements
non-testimonial) and the timing of the declarant's response. In the case of
non-testimonial statements, such cross-examination might resolve any
remaining doubts as to whether the accused's right to confrontation has
been fulfilled.
A valid concern regarding the primary intent test is that declarants
might presume they are obligated to provide information to a police
officer-a sort of "color of authority" effect. 12' The influence of such a
presumed obligation would surely place the interrogation evoking the
statements in the risky realm of prosecutorial abuse. 122 This high risk
deserves ample attention. In addition to requesting personal information in
the regular line of questioning, measures must be taken to ensure against
any form of intimidation by police in procuring such information from
witnesses. 123 While it may rightfully be assumed that police officers would
err on the side of discouraging declarants from offering personal
information to enable statements to come into evidence without the burden
of confrontation, the validity of the primary intent test requires safeguards
on both ends of the spectrum. Therefore, police officers must also not
encourage declarants to provide personal contact information. The proper
regulation would require officers to ask declarants something along the
lines of, "Would you like to provide your contact information?" to
neutrally indicate that divulgence is not mandatory. Any hesitation on the
120. See Booth v. State, 508 A.2d 976, 981 (Md. 1986) (In a Federal Rules of Evidence
803(1) present sense impression analysis, "[tihe appropriate inquiry is whether, considering the
surrounding circumstances, sufficient time elapsed to have permitted reflective thought.");
CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 271 (John William Strong ed., 4th ed.
1992).
121. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 282 (8th ed. 2004) ("The appearance or presumption of
authority sanctioning a public officer's actions.").
122. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 n.7 (2004).
123. See Lininger, supra note 13, at 323.
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declarant's part may warrant an explanation by the officer that providing
information is purely voluntary. As with concerns of prosecutorial abuse,
the high stakes and delicate nature of this procedure should grant the
accused the right to confront and cross-examine the questioning officer to
ensure the officer strictly followed procedure and did not lead or persuade
the declarant in any manner.
In summary, the proposed primary intent test posits that a declarant's
intent is demonstrated by whether or not the declarant immediately
provided their personal contact information in response to police
questioning. The officer's request for personal information must be made
in the regular line of questioning and the form of interrogation must
demonstrate that it is voluntary to supply such information. Because Davis
states that the analysis should focus on the declarant's statements,' 24 the
declarant's intent in making those statements becomes the circumstantial
evidence that objectively indicates the primary purpose of the interrogation.
Under the primary intent test, providing personal contact information
objectively indicates that the primary purpose of the interrogation was to
establish facts relevant to future prosecution because the declarant is
willing to be contacted by authorities in the future. Opting not to provide
contact information objectively indicates that the primary purpose of the
interrogation was solely to assist in the resolution of the ongoing
emergency because the declarant manifested an unwillingness to participate
in any future potential prosecution. Combining the primary intent test with
the Davis framework, 125 a declarant who provides personal contact
information yields a testimonial statement; failing to provide such
information results in a non-testimonial statement. Disputes as to the
method of police questioning may be resolved by allowing the accused to
cross-examine the questioning officer.
V. Application of the "Primary Intent Test" to the Hypothetical
Fact Pattern
Applying the proposed primary intent test to the hypothetical fact
pattern above demonstrates its functionality and efficiency. Although the
first instinct is to analyze witness statements under applicable hearsay
rules, declarant statements must first pass through the gate of Confrontation
126
Clause scrutiny before hearsay standards apply.
124. Davis v. Washington, From Lexis: 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2274* n.1, 165 L. Ed. 2d 224, 237
n. 1, 2006 U.S. LEXIS 4886, 16 n. 1.(2006) *All paginationsubject to change pending release of
the finalpublished version.
125. See id. at 2273-74.
126.

Malhotra, supra note 4, at 236.
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A. Wife's Statements
After stating what she saw, heard, and experienced, the wife (without
time for reflection) provided her personal contact information at the request
of the questioning officer. Her answers to police interrogation provide no
additional indication as to whether she intended her statements to be used
solely to address the emergency at hand or for use in future prosecution.
Moreover, because the emergency was ongoing at the time of questioning,
the surrounding circumstances do not provide any definitive hints as to the
wife's intent. Therefore, use of the Davis framework alone in this
circumstance does not indicate whether the wife's statements were
testimonial or non-testimonial.
Applying the primary intent test, the wife's offer of contact
information demonstrated a strong willingness to assist law enforcement
agencies in the future, indicating a primary purpose to establish past events
relevant to later prosecution.1 27 The wife's statements would therefore be
testimonial and, because she displayed a willingness to assist, she placed
herself in a position to be confronted and cross-examined by the accused
gunman at trial.
The wife's statements must also pass through a hearsay analysis to be
entered into evidence by the prosecution. Because her statements to a
police officer would presumably be offered to prove the truth of the matter
asserted, they are hearsay.' 28 However, the statements would be admissible
13
29
into evidence under the Present Sense Impression1 or Excited Utterance 0
hearsay exceptions because they were made immediately following the
incident while still under the stress of the traumatic events.
Therefore, because the wife volunteered her personal contact
information, she manifested the intention to assist in future prosecution.
That intent provides the objective circumstances that indicate "the primary
purpose of the interrogation [was] to establish or prove past events
potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution."' 31 The wife's statements
would be subject to confrontation at trial.
B. Husband's Statements
For whatever reason, the husband had the exact opposite reaction to
the officer's request as his wife and opted to not provide his personal

127. See Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2273-74.
128. FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
129. Id. 803(1).
130. Id. 803(2).
131.

Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2273-74.
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contact information.
Neither his statements nor the surrounding
circumstance provide any indication as to his intent; therefore, the Davis
framework similarly does not provide guidance for placing his statements
in the testimonial or non-testimonial bucket.
That the husband declined to provide his personal contact information
for future contact from police or other government agencies regarding the
situation provides a strong indication that while he wished to assist in
resolving the ongoing emergency 132 by providing an account of the
incident, he did not wish to be implicated beyond that point. Thus, under
the primary intent test, the husband's statements should be classified as
non-testimonial and admissible under a valid hearsay exception. 133 Just
like his wife's statements, the husband's statements would fall under either
of the same hearsay exceptions because they were made immediately after
and while still under the stress of the incident. 134 Therefore, the husband's
statements would be admitted into evidence against the accused without
any constitutional requirement of confrontation.
VI. Public Policy Reasons for Adopting the
"Primary Intent Test"
In addition to the textual and logical reasons for using the primary
intent test, there are strong public policy reasons for doing so.
A. Ensure Continued Reporting of Crimes
The Crawford and Davis holdings increased the probability that
declarants will be called upon to testify against a perpetrator or even their
abuser. The very thought of such confrontation may deter victims and
witnesses from reporting crimes and/or filing police reports. 135 More than
mere anxiety of confrontation, openly testifying in the face of the accused
may generate a valid fear of reprisal. 136 This is especially true when, but
for their testimonial statements, a witness would otherwise have remained
132. See id. at 2273.
133. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004).
134. See FED. R. EVID. 803(l)-(2).
135. Cf Lininger, supra note 13, at 285.
136. See Tom Lininger, Bearing the Cross, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1353, 1366 (2005)
(Supreme Court's confrontation requirements discourage some victims from reporting crimes);
Jeanine Percival, Note, The Price of Silence: The Prosecution of Domestic Violence Cases in
Light ofCrawford v. Washington, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 213, 241 (2005) (arguing that confrontation
requirements will lead to distrust in the criminal justice system and result in fewer victims
reporting crimes); Robert Tharp, Domestic Violence Cases Face New Test: Ruling That Suspects
Can Confront Accusers Scares Some Victimsfrom Court, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 6, 2004,
at Al.
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anonymous. The primary intent test provides, when the primary purpose of
the interrogation is not clear, some degree of predictability for witnesses as
to whether their statements will require confrontation. It ensures that the
faceless witness may retain that identity in mixed-purpose interrogations.
This preservation of anonymity is crucial to the continued encouragement
of the citizenry to report crimes. 137 Too broad an interpretation of the
Confrontation Clause would breed a society of fear where intimidation,
instead of justice, governs. Providing a degree of predictability and
allowing anonymous witnesses to retain their anonymity requires a
standard to bridge the Davis divide. The primary intent test is that
standard.
B. Preserve Effective Criminal Prosecution
Although its recentness precludes reliance on confirming empirical
data, some authors predicted a decline in the number of criminal
convictions after Davis.1 38 The effect is potentially more acute in domestic
violence cases as "[a] high proportion of battered women refuse to testify
against their assailants." 139 Even the Davis majority acknowledged the
criminal "windfall" potential in such situations. 140 Without live witness
testimony, prosecutors must rely solely on physical and circumstantial
evidence to build their cases. 141 The practical impact of Davis is that its
asymmetry 142 now requires prosecutors to convince many more declarants
to testify at trial. As discussed above, declarant-witnesses of violent crimes
have an understandable apprehension of confrontation for fear of
reprisal.1 43 More exacting prosecution requirements144 allow criminals to
walk, thereby endangering the public at large.

137. State v. Wright, 686 N.W.2d 295, 302 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004) ("[T]he caller wants
protection from an immediate danger, not because the 911 caller expects the report to be used
later at trial with the caller bearing witness-rather, there is a cloak of anonymity ...that
encourages citizens to make emergency calls and not fear repercussion.").
138. Lininger, supra note 13, at 284. See also David G. Savage, High CourtLimits Domestic
Abuse Crime Reports as Trial Testimony, L.A. TIMES, June 20, 2006, at A8 (discussing the
negative impact of Davis on domestic abuse prosecutions).
139. Lininger, supra note 13, at 272.
140. See Davis v. Washington, From Lexis: 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2279-80*, 165 L. Ed. 2d 224,
244, 2006 U.S. LEXIS 4886, 32 (2006) *All paginationsubject to change pending release of the
final published version.
141. See Malhotra, supra note 4, at 214.
142. Lininger, supra note 13, at 274 ("Some argued that Davis created a lamentable
asymmetry in confrontation law: the right to confront declarants of testimonial hearsay was now
too strong, while the right to confront declarants of non-testimonial hearsay was now too weak.").
143. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.

Winter 20081

BRIDGING THE DA VIS v. WASHINGTON DIVIDE

Unpredictability and inconsistency were two major concerns the
Crawford Court had with the Roberts test. 14 5 The lack of a clear standard
in the gray area of Davis, as to indistinguishable primary-purpose
statements, addresses neither concern. Effective criminal prosecution (and
defense for that matter) requires predictability as to how declarant-witness
statements will be classified. Moreover, an effective judiciary requires
unambiguous and consistent rules of general application. The primarypurpose test creates a clear, consistent, and predictable rule for drawing the
lines in testimonial/non-testimonial classification. As such, it serves to
combat the vices of Roberts left unaddressed by Crawford and Davis.
VII. Conclusion
Courts should adopt the proposed primary intent test when the primary
purpose of a declarant's statements to interrogating police officers is
indistinguishable. The Davis opinion left open a wide chasm between
testimonial and non-testimonial statements, creating an unpredictable gray
area. The primary intent test provides clear guidance to maneuver through
that foggy gorge. The focal point in determining the primary purpose of an
interrogation is the declarant's intent in making statements to questioning
law enforcement officials. Courts should derive intent from the declarant's
objective actions, specifically, whether or not the declarant, without time
for reflection, gave interrogating officers their personal contact
information. Providing information demonstrates the intent to assist in
future prosecution, while declining to provide information demonstrates the
intent to assist exclusively in the resolution of the immediate and ongoing
emergency. Within the Davis framework, the declarant's intent becomes
the circumstantial evidence that objectively indicates the primary purpose
of the interrogation. Therefore, if a declarant provides contact information,
the statements made during the interrogation were testimonial and the
Constitution entitles the accused to confrontation. If no information was
provided, the statements were non-testimonial and the confrontation
requirement is waived.
The primary intent test is completely congruent with the Supreme
Court's most recent Confrontation Clause rulings. It protects against the
abuses the Framers feared and preserves an accused's constitutional right to
confrontation when the declarant truly intended his or her statements to be
used prosecutorially. The test provides uniformity, predictability, and
144. See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 657 (1984) (referring to strict Miranda
requirements, the Court admits that "the primary social cost of those added protections is the

possibility of fewer convictions .... ").
145. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 66 (2004).
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consistency for prosecutors, defense attorneys, and the judiciary.
Moreover, it maintains balance in the criminal justice system by protecting
both perpetrators and innocent witnesses. While the Supreme Court may
have left a gaping hole in this area of evidence law and criminal procedure,
bridges can be built to span the divide.

